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SURVEY ARTICLES

Administrative Law
by Mark H. Cohen*
and
David C. Will'"
This Article covers important developments in Georgia administrative
law for the two-year period from June 1, 1997 through May 31, 1999.
Because administrative law has been omitted from major consideration
in the Annual Survey of Georgia Law since 1987,1 this Article is an
attempt to cover an additional period of review, which, the authors hope,
* Of Counsel in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., with high honors, 1976; J.D., 1979). Coauthor, Georgia'sOpen Records
and Open Meetings Laws: A Continued March Toward Government in the Sunshine, 40
MERCER L. REV. 1 (1988); Coauthor, Administrative Law, 39 MERCER L. REV. 33 (1987);
Coauthor, AdministrativeLaw, 38 MERCER L. REV. 17 (1986). Chairperson, Administrative
Law Section, State Bar of Georgia (1992-1993). Chief State Administrative Law Judge

(1995). Member, State Bars of Arizona and Georgia.
** Member in the firm of Harman, Owen, Saunders & Sweeney, Atlanta, Georgia.
Florida State University (B.S., 1976); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law
(J.D., 1979). Member, Mercer Law Review (1977-1979); Georgia Survey Editor (1978-1979).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. See Mark H. Cohen & Stephanie B. Manis, Administrative Law, 39 MERCER L. REV.
33 (1987).
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will be continued in future surveys. This Article includes cases as well
as a discussion of two significant legislative enactments during the
survey period.
I.

OVERVIEW

An historical overview of the progression and importance of administrative law in Georgia reveals how far and fast this area of law has
developed.
Today, administrative law undoubtedly impacts more
individual lives than does our court system. Back in the earliest editions
of the Georgia Survey, Professor Maurice Culp, who penned the first
fifteen annual surveys of administrative law, bemoaned the "dearth of
judicial development" in the area and opined that "prompt and thorough
development of administrative law in Georgia must come from a
pioneering legislative effort." 2 As if taking the cue, the 1964 Georgia
General Assembly enacted the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), 3 which Professor Culp called "perhaps the most important
single advance in administrative law [in Georgia] during this century.'
The expressed statutory purpose of the APA is not to "create or
diminish any substantive rights or delegated authority," but "to provide
a procedure for administrative determination and regulation where
expressly authorized by law or otherwise required by the Constitution
or a statute of this state."5 In reality, the APA fulfills two important
legal purposes. First, and foremost, the APA "resolve[s] conflicts within
the authority vested in administrative agencies without resort to courts
of record in the first instance."' Second, the APA provides "uniform,
minimum procedural requirements to be followed by an administrative
agency in determining the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party, in
matters in which the particular agency regulates."'
In the thirty-five years since the APA's inception, what may have
begun as a dearth of cases exploring the parameters of administrative
law has turned into a plethora of judicial decisions on issues concerning
the promulgation of administrative regulations, the administrative
hearing process, the availability of judicial remedies, and the standards
for appellate review.

2. Maurice S. Culp, Administrative Law, 14 MERCER L. REV. 7, 7 (1962).
3. 1964 Ga. Laws 338 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-1 to -44 (1998 & Supp.
1999)).
4. Maurice S. Culp, Administrative Law, 16 MERCER L. REV. 12, 13 (1964).
5. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 (1998).
6. Georgia State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Daniels, 137 Ga. App. 706, 709, 224 S.E.2d
820, 822 (1976).
7. 1965 Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-73, at 119.
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This Article analyzes the appellate decisions issued during the survey
period that discuss many of these issues. The Georgia Court of Appeals
reviewed the validity of agency regulatory actions in different contexts,
and the General Assembly enacted a new law permitting the granting
of variances and waivers to agency rules. The appellate courts discussed
several issues relating to the administrative hearing process, including
whether statements made during an agency investigation are privileged,
the availability of any recourse if an administrative decision is untimely,
the extent to which a summary determination is appropriate, the impact
of the denial of the right to confront witnesses, and an agency's reversal
of an administrative law judge's recommendation.
This Article further reviews the principle requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the availability of other forms of equitable
relief. The courts continued to reaffirm, if not expand, the use of the
"any evidence rule" as a standard of review in various circumstances.
Two cases also dealt with the ability to appeal a superior court's decision
involving an administrative order to an appellate tribunal. Finally, this
Article discusses two cases interpreting recent legislative changes to
Georgia's open records and open meetings laws.
II.
A.

RULES AND

REGULATIONS

Validity of Agency Interpretations

When the General Assembly enacts laws of general application, it
usually delegates to administrative agencies the authority to carry out
its legislative mandates by the promulgation and adoption of rules and
regulations.8 An agency "has only such powers as the legislature has
expressly, or by necessary implication, conferred upon it."9
When a statute provides broad regulatory authority to an agency,
great weight is given to the agency's interpretation of the law, as long
as it is consistent with the statutory framework. In St. Joseph's
Hospital, Inc. v. Thunderbolt Health Care, Inc.,"0 the court of appeals
reviewed the decision of the State Health Planning Agency ("SHPA")
granting a certificate of need for the addition of eleven nursing home
beds to St. Joseph's, which proposed to accomplish this addition by the
conversion of general acute care hospital beds into "subacute care" beds
in a skilled nursing unit."1 On appeal by Thunderbolt, the trial court

8.
9.
10.
11.

Eason v. Morrison, 181 Ga. 322, 324, 182 S.E. 163, 165 (1935).
Bentley v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 152 Ga. 836, 838, 111 S.E. 379, 381 (1922).
237 Ga. App. 454, 517 S.E.2d 334 (1999).
Id. at 454, 517 S.E.2d at 335.
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reversed SHPA's decision because it "was improper."" Because the
statute was silent as to the definition of a "nursing home," the focus of
the appeal was whether "subacute care" equated to "nursing home"
service. While the agency's rules did not precisely resolve the issue, the
agency's health planning expert testified that subacute care was
consistent with skilled nursing care.1" The court of appeals gave
credence to that interpretation and reversed the trial court's decision,
concluding that "[tihe interpretation of a statute by an administrative
agency which has the duty of enforcing or administering it is to be given
great weight and deference." 4 Unless an agency's interpretation of its
enabling statute or its rules exceeds the authority granted to it by the
courts are required to give that interpretation
legislature, 5 reviewing
16
controlling weight.
Nevertheless, the appellate courts will not hesitate to invalidate an
administrative regulation that they find violative of the pertinent
enabling statute. In GeorgiaPublic Service Commission v. Alltel Georgia
Communications Corp.,'7 the Public Service Commission ("PSC")
initiated an administrative action to interpret and implement a section
of The Telecommunications and Competition Development Act of 1995",
that provides for an alternative form of regulation for certain local
exchange companies. 19 The court of appeals, after conducting a
detailed analysis of the enabling law, held that the PSC's interpretation
violated the terms of the statute.20
The bottom line for any person seeking to challenge the validity of an
administrative rule is that absent a showing that the rule is not
authorized by statute or is unreasonable, 2' the appellate court will
usually give an agency broad leeway in promulgating and adopting
regulations.

12.

Id.

13. Id. at 455-57, 517 S.E.2d at 337.
14. Id. at 457-58, 517 S.E.2d at 337 (citing Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County v. State
Health Planning Agency, 211 Ga. App. 407, 408, 438 S.E.2d 912, 914 (1993)).
15. See HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Roach, 265 Ga. 501, 502-03, 458 S.E.2d 118,
120-21 (1995).
16. 237 Ga. App. at 458-59, 517 S.E.2d at 339.
17. 230 Ga. App. 563, 497 S.E.2d 50 (1998).
18. O.C.G.A. §§ 46-5-160 to -174 (Supp. 1999).
19. 230 Ga. App. at 563, 497 S.E.2d at 51.
20. Id. at 566-67, 497 S.E.2d at 53-54.
21. See, e.g., Brown v. State Bd. of Exam'rs of Psychologists, 190 Ga. App. 311,312, 378
S.E.2d 719, 720 (1989).
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B.

Variances and Waivers to Administrative Rules
The APA sets forth the procedural requirements for the adoption,
amendment, or repeal of a rule or regulation." Prior to 1997, the only
means available to avoid the application of an agency rule were to
petition the agency to amend or repeal the rule23 or to ask for a waiver
of the rule if the agency's rules permitted such a request. 24 The strict
application of certain rules occasionally caused somewhat inequitable
results.2"
In an effort to give agencies the authority to modify a rule or to
exempt its application to avoid significant and unintended hardship
without having to go through the formal APA rulemaking process, the
1997 General Assembly amended the APA to permit the granting of
variances or waivers to agency rules.26 Based upon a similar provision
in the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, the law now permits
many agencies 28 to grant a variance29 or waiver 0 if the person subject to a rule

22. See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4 (1998).
23. See id. § 50-13-9.
24. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. R. 290-2-2-.15 (1991) (allowing Department of
Human Resources to grant variance or waiver from rules setting standards for day care
centers).
25. See, e.g., Brown v. State Bd. of Exam'rs of Psychologists, 190 Ga. App. 311, 378
S.E.2d 718 (1989) (applicant for psychologist license satisfied old examining board rule
requiring graduation from a school accredited at the time of application but not new rule
requiring graduation from a school accredited when degree was received).
26. 1997 Ga. Laws 1521 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 50-13-9.1 (1998 & Supp.
1999)).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.542 (West Supp. 1999).
28. The provisions apply to all rules adopted by state boards, commissions, and
departments that are included in the definition of "agency" under the APA, O.C.G.A. § 5013-2(1) (Supp. 1999), except for rules and regulations promulgated or adopted (1) "to
implement or promote a federally delegated program," (2) "by the Department of
Corrections concerning any institutional operations or inmate activities," (3) "by the State
Board of Pardons and Paroles regarding clemency considerations and actions," (4) "by the
Department of Community Health," (5) "by the Department of Agriculture," (6) "by the
Department of Natural Resources for the protection of the natural resources, environment,
or vital areas of [Georgia]," or (7) when "[tihe granting of a waiver or variance would be
harmful to the public health, safety, or welfare." O.C.G.A. § 50-13-9.1(h)(1)-(7) (Supp.
1999).
29. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-9.1(b)(2) (Supp. 1999) ("'Variance' means a decision by an agency
to grant a modification to all or part of the literal requirements of a rule to a person who
is subject to the rule.").
30. Id. § 50-13-9.1(b)(3) ("'Waiver' means a decision by an agency not to apply all or
part of a rule to a person who is subject to the rule.").
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demonstrates that the purpose of the underlying statute upon which
the rule is based can be or has been achieved by other specific means
which are agreeable to the person seeking the variance or waiver and
that strict application of the rule would create a substantial hardship
to such person. 3
To obtain a variance or waiver, a person subject to a rule must first
file a petition that meets specific statutory prerequisites.3 2 A register
of pending requests for variances or waivers and those that have been
approved is required to be posted on GeorgiaNet, which is the state's
official Internet website. 33 The agency's decision, which must be issued
in writing, can be appealed by filing either (1) a petition for judicial
review if the original petitioner's request is denied, or (2) an action for
declaratory judgment by some other interested party if the waiver or
variance is granted.34

III.
A.

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

Statements Made During Investigations

Prior to bringing formal allegations against a particular license or
permit holder, usually following a complaint lodged by a private citizen,
an administrative agency often will conduct an investigation of the
charges. In Skoglund v. Durham,35 the court of appeals addressed the
question, apparently one of first impression, of whether statements made
during such an investigation are entitled to the absolute privilege that
is afforded to parties for allegations contained in pleadings filed in civil
actions.
After Skoglund filed an application to obtain a broker's license from
the Georgia Real Estate Commission, a couple who claimed they had
been defrauded by Skoglund filed a request for the commission to

31. Id. § 50-13-9.1(c).
32. Id. § 50-13-9.1(d). The petition must specify, in addition to any other requirements
that may be imposed by a particular agency, (1) "[tlhe rule from which a variance or waiver
is requested," (2) "[tlhe type of action requested," (3) "the specific facts of substantial
hardship which would justify a variance or waiver" (including alternative standards that
the petitioner agrees to meet and that will afford adequate protection to the public), and
(4) "the reason why the variance or waiver requested would serve the purpose of the
underlying statute." Id. § 50-13-9.1(d)(1)-(4).
33. Id. § 50-13-9.1(c).
34. Id. § 50-13-9.1(e)-(f). "The agency... shall grant or deny a petition for variance or
waiver in writing no earlier than 15 days after the posting of the petition on the register
and no more than 60 days after receipt of the petition." Id. § 50-13-9.1(e).
35. 233 Ga. App. 158, 502 S.E.2d 814 (1998).
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investigate his conduct. Skoglund then filed a defamation action against
the couple, which the trial court dismissed, finding that the allegations
made in the request to investigate were entitled to an absolute
privilege.36
On appeal the court reviewed the policy behind O.C.G.A. section 51-58, which applies an absolute privilege for "'[aill charges, allegations, and
averments contained in regular pleadings filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction, which are pertinent and material to the relief sought."'37
In analyzing the nature of the proceeding before the commission, the
court found it to be quasi-judicial because the enabling statute provided
for an investigation following the filing of a sworn complaint, the
issuance of subpoenas to compel production of documents, and a hearing
on the merits. 38 In addition, not only does public policy support the
application of an absolute privilege for allegations of fraud, but the
commission's statute also protects documents contained in the investigative file from inspection. 9
It would appear to make little sense for the legislature to provide a
statutory scheme for policing the integrity of the real estate profession
by reporting unprofessional conduct and then for this Court to stymie
the process by permitting libel actions against those who do as contemplated by the statute and report such conduct.4"
While licensees are still entitled to receive exculpatory materials from
an investigative file, including the identity of the complainant if that
information is viewed as arguably favorable for the defense,41 there is
no right to general discovery in an administrative proceeding.42 Also,
the court in Skoglund, while rightfully protecting those who file
complaints against licensees, supported the continued confidentiality of
the administrative investigatory process, making it difficult for those
accused of violating the law or an administrative regulation to
43 uncover
the supporting material behind the allegations against them.

36. Id. at 158, 502 S.E.2d at 815.
37. Id. at 159, 502 S.E.2d at 816 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-5-8) (alteration by court).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 160-61, 502 S.E.2d at 816-17.
40. Id. at 161, 502 S.E.2d at 817.
41. Wills v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 259 Ga. 549, 553, 384 S.E.2d 636,
639-40 (1989).
42. See Lansford v. Cook, 252 Ga. 414, 415, 314 S.E.2d 103, 104-05 (1984); Georgia
State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Daniels, 137 Ga. App. 706, 709, 224 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1976).
43. 233 Ga. App. at 160, 502 S.E.2d at 817.
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Deadline for Issuing Administrative Decisions
The APA provides that "[elach agency shall render a final decision in
contested cases within 30 days after the close of the record" unless the
time period is extended by order." Although appellants have argued
that decisions issued by agencies after the thirty-day period should be
reversed, the appellate courts historically have read this seemingly
mandatory time constraint as discretionary only.45 This trend continued during the survey period.
In Safety Fire Commissioner v. U.S.A. Gas, Inc.,46 the court of
appeals summarily rejected the argument that the failure of the fire
commissioner to issue a decision before the expiration of the thirty-day
period mandated reversal of the agency's final decision.47 The court
engaged in a more detailed analysis one year later in Thebaut v. Georgia
B.

Board of Dentistry,4 when the court reviewed an appeal from a

decision issued by the state's dental board more than thirty days after
the close of the record.49
In Thebaut the court focused on O.C.G.A. section 1-3-1(c), which
provides that "substantial compliance" with a statutory requirement by
public officers is sufficient unless the law expressly provides penalties
for noncompliance.5" Because the APA provision did not provide for
invalidation of an out-of-time decision, and because there was no specific
harm shown, the thirty-day decision-making requirement was once again
held to be discretionary rather than mandatory."1 For the first time,
however, there was some judicial consternation over the untimeliness of
the agency decision, as shown by the majority's direction that the board
"aggressively endeavor" to meet the thirty-day deadline for issuing its
decision52 and the concurrer's regret over the weakening of the word
"shall" by the appellate courts.53 Nevertheless, unless re-examined by
the judiciary, a challenge to an administrative decision based on
untimeliness will continue to fall on mostly deaf ears.

44.
45.
(1983).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17(c) (1998).
See, e.g., Hardison v. Fayssoux, 168 Ga. App. 398, 400, 309 S.E.2d 397, 398-99
229 Ga. App. 807, 494 S.E.2d 706 (1997).
Id. at 809-10, 494 S.E.2d at 709.
235 Ga. App. 194, 509 S.E.2d 125 (1998).
Id. at 194, 509 S.E.2d at 127.
Id. at 195, 509 S.E.2d at 128.
Id. at 196, 509 S.E.2d at 129.
Id.
Id. at 203-04, 509 S.E.2d at 133-34 (Ruffin, J., concurring specially).
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C. Propriety of Summary Determinations in Administrative
Proceedings
The Civil Practice Act does not apply to contested cases arising under
the APA.54 Nevertheless, "[t]he rules of evidence as applied in the trial
of civil nonjury cases" apply to administrative hearings, 55 and other
segments of civil procedure have crept into administrative practice by
rule.56 One procedural approach has been the use of summary determination, which allows the administrative law judge ("AW") to decide cases
in which there are no disputed, genuine issues of material fact, and
which is similar to summary judgment procedure under the Civil
Practice Act." A recent appeal of a summary administrative determination reveals that while appellate courts may recognize the availability
of the procedure, they will apply the same standards applicable to review
of orders granting summary judgment in civil proceedings.
In Children's Hospital of Pittsburghv. Georgia Departmentof Medical
Assistance,58 the state Medicaid agency approved an evaluation of a
Georgia child for a bowel transplant by a Pittsburgh hospital. Following
the evaluation and three hospitalizations in Georgia for liver problems,
the child was transferred upon physician recommendation back to the
Pittsburgh hospital, where he died after an extended stay. The
Department of Medical Assistance denied the hospital's request for
reimbursement. Upon an administrative appeal, the ALJ granted the
department's motion for summary determination, finding that there were
no genuine issues of material fact because no prior authorization had
been received for the out-of-state services. The superior court affirmed
the ALJ's decision, but the court of appeals reversed.59
The issue on appeal was whether the ALJ correctly concluded that
there was not a factual issue concerning the provision of services to the
child on an emergency basis.6" The court of appeals found that the
superior court erred by failing to conduct the type of de novo review
required in cases reviewing the appropriateness of a grant of summary

54. Daniels, 137 Ga. App. at 709, 224 S.E.2d at 822.
55. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-15(1) (1998).
56. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. R. 295-5-.04 (providing for the exchange of lists of
witnesses and documents to be offered into evidence in proceedings initiated on behalf of
state examining boards).
57. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. R. 616-1-2-.15. For the summary judgment procedure under
the Civil Practice Act, see O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 (1993 & Supp. 1999).
58. 235 Ga. App. 697, 509 S.E.2d 725 (1998).
59. Id. at 697-98, 509 S.E.2d at 725-26.
60. Id. at 700, 509 S.E.2d at 727.
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judgment.61 Because a de novo review revealed that there were
competing affidavits from the hospital and the department as to whether
the transfer to Pittsburgh was critically necessary, the ALJ's grant of
summary determination was erroneous. 12
While summary determination is a viable procedure for concluding
administrative appeals without a full evidentiary hearing, practitioners
should recognize that the procedure will be treated like a summary
judgment motion. As a result, conflicting affidavits will likely result in
the denial of the motion, and the ALJ will hear and decide the factual
disputes.
D. ProceduralDue Process Issues
During the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court reached
differing conclusions in two cases on whether a particular administrative
procedure violated principles of procedural due process. The court ruled
that the state's statutory scheme for investigating alleged teacher
misconduct and issuing appropriate disciplinary sanctions comported
with due process. In Gee v. Professional Practices Commission, 3 the
court held that the investigation and hearing before the Professional
Practices Commission, with a subsequent report of recommendations to
the Professional Standards Commission for final action, "more than
satisfies the requirements of procedural due process."64 Subsequent to
Gee the Professional Practices Commission was abolished, and the
investigative and adjudicatory functions for teacher discipline are now
combined within the Professional Standards Commission. 5
In 1996 the General Assembly enacted legislation amending the
statutory provisions providing for the establishment and maintenance of
a central registry of confirmed and unconfirmed cases of child abuse.66
Upon completion of an investigation into allegations of abuse, the law
provides that an investigator must classify the report as either
"unfounded," "confirmed," or "unconfirmed."7 After the alleged abuser

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id., 509 S.E.2d at 728.
Id.
268 Ga. 491, 491 S.E.2d 375 (1997).
Id. at 493, 491 S.E.2d at 376.

65. See O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-982 to -984.5 (Supp. 1999).
66. See id. §§ 49-5-180 to -187 (1998).
67. Id. § 49-5-183. The law defines "unfounded" as a "determin[ation] that there is no
credible evidence that child abuse occurred." Id. § 49-5-180(12). " 'Confirmed' means that
an investigation ...has revealed that there is equal or greater credible evidence that child
abuse occurred than the credible evidence that child abuse did not occur." Id. § 49-5-

180(6). Finally, the law defines "unconfirmed" as a determination "that there is some
credible evidence that child abuse occurred but there is not sufficient credible evidence to
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is notified of the classification, a hearing could be requested before an
ALJ within ten days of receipt of the notice. 6 3 The statute prohibits the
accused abuser from compelling a child under age fourteen to testify at
the hearing. 9 Although the ALJ's decision as to whether the evidence
meets the required standards for classification can be appealed to the
superior court, that court's decision is not appealable under the
statute.70
In State v. Jackson,71 a person who was acquitted of criminal child
molestation charges but placed on the child abuse registry as a
confirmed abuser challenged the law in a declaratory judgment
action. 72 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court that
the statute providing for the administrative classification of a child
abuser was unconstitutional.73 Contrary to the State's contention, the
court found that listing someone on an abuse registry impacts that
person's liberty interest and that preventing the accused from compelling
a child's testimony in administrative proceedings violates the accused's
due process rights.7 4
E. Agency Review of the ALJ's Initial Decision
For most agencies under the parameters of the APA, there is a twotiered administrative hearing process. First, the agency representative
or AL issues to the agency or department head an initial recommended
decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. 75

Then,

upon review of that initial decision, the agency or official issues a final
decision after a review of the whole record, giving due regard to the
ALJ's opportunity to observe witnesses.76 If the agency or department
head rejects or modifies a finding of fact or proposed decision, the
reasons for doing so must be in writing.77
In Thebaut v. Georgia Board of Dentistry," the court of appeals
discussed the inherent difficulty in an agency reversing an ALJ's initial
decision, particularly with respect to factual determinations. In a

classify that child abuse as confirmed." Id. § 49-5-180(10).
68. Id. § 49-5-183.1(d).
69. Id. § 49-5-183.1(i).
70. Id. § 49-5-183.1(g).
71. 269 Ga. 308, 496 S.E.2d 912 (1998).
72. Id. at 308, 496 S.E.2d at 913.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 310-12, 496 S.E.2d at 915-17.
75. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-17(b), -41(c) (1998).
76. Id. § 50-13-41(d).
77. Id.
78. 235 Ga. App. 194, 509 S.E.2d 125 (1998).
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proceeding brought on behalf of the dental board, the ALJ, after
weighing expert testimony presented by the state and the accused
dentist, issued an initial decision against the board and held that the
evidence did not support a finding that the dentist's actions fell below
acceptable medical standards. On review the board, after hearing the
testimony of only the dentist charged, reversed the ALJ and substituted
its own finding that the standards fell below minimal acceptable
standards."9
After discussing the national split of authority concerning whether a
professional licensing board can issue findings of negligence based upon
its own expertise, the court adopted the majority view that it should not,
thereby reversing the board's determination. 0
[W]here the issues of competence and negligence are of a complicated
nature, expert testimony is required to establish the proper competency
standards and whether or not they are met. To do otherwise would
render this appellate court's review meaningless, as absent expert
testimony, we cannot, by telepathy, act as mind readers determining
from an empty record the factual determinations of the Board members.81
Consequently, on appeal it may be difficult to sustain a reversal of an

ALJ's factual decision by the final decision-maker unless there is
additional testimony presented to justify an agency's new or different
findings of fact.
IV.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The APA authorizes any person who has exhausted all administrative

remedies to seek review of an agency decision in superior court.8 2 On

the other hand, the APA expressly does not preclude using "other means
of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law." 3 As a
general rule, the law requires a party aggrieved by an agency's decision
to raise all issues before the agency and to exhaust any available
administrative remedy before filing a petition for judicial review or
otherwise initiating a judicial action for equitable relief.8 4 The only

79. Id. at 194, 509 S.E.2d at 127.
80. Id. at 201-02, 509 S.E.2d at 132-33.
81. Id. at 202-03, 509 S.E.2d at 133 (quoting In re Schramm, 414 N.W.2d 31, 36-37
(S.D. 1987)).
82. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a) (1998).
83. Id.
84. See Lansford, 252 Ga. at 415, 314 S.E.2d at 105; Brogdon v. State Bd. of Veterinary
Med., 244 Ga. 780, 781, 262 S.E.2d 56, 57 (1979).
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exception to this general rule is when an administrative remedy is either
unavailable or inadequate.85
The failure to pursue judicial review following an agency decision
normally will preclude a later effort to seek equitable relief in superior
court to challenge the same agency action. For example, in Chambers
8
of Georgia,Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources,"
the department's
Environmental Protection Division ("EPD") denied an application for a
solid waste handling permit, and the unsuccessful applicant did not file
a petition for judicial review to appeal that decision. Fourteen months
later, the aggrieved party filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive
relief, alleging that it had been harmed by the denial of the application,
that the statute relied upon by the EPD in its earlier denial was
unconstitutional, and that further efforts at administrative review would
be futile. 7 The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that declaratory
judgment was not available when the applicant could have raised the
issue in the earlier administrative proceeding or on appeal to the
superior court as part of a petition for judicial review.8
Requiring parties to exhaust administrative remedies is also a
recognition by the judiciary of the APA's primary goal to allow agencies
to exercise their expertise in interpreting their regulations without
resort to courts in the first instance. The supreme court again strongly
set forth this principle in Cerulean Cos. v. Tller,9 which arose out of
the conversion of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia from a nonprofit
to a for-profit entity.90

85. See Moss v. Central State Hosp., 255 Ga. 403, 404, 339 S.E.2d 226, 227 (1986);
Galaxy Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Massengill, 255 Ga. 360, 361, 338 S.E.2d 428, 430 (1986).
86. 232 Ga. App. 632, 502 S.E.2d 553 (1998).
87. Id. at 632-33, 502 S.E.2d at 554.
88. Id. at 633, 502 S.E.2d at 555. Although an AIU or agency lacks authority to declare
a statute unconstitutional, the courts still require an applicant to raise the issue first at
the administrative level so that the constitutional objection can be properly considered on
review after administrative proceedings have concluded. See Flint River Mills v. Henry,
234 Ga. 385, 386-87, 216 S.E.2d 895, 896-97 (1975); North Fulton Community Hosp., Inc.
v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 168 Ga. App. 801, 803, 310 S.E.2d 764, 767
(1983).
89. 271 Ga. 65, 516 S.E.2d 522 (1999).
90. Id. at 65, 516 S.E.2d at 522. Georgia law allows a nonprofit corporation governed
by the Health Care Plan Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 33-20-1 to -34 (1992 & Supp. 1999), to merge
with, or amend its articles of incorporation to become, a for-profit corporation, provided
that it submits a plan of conversion to the Insurance Commissioner and notifies the
Attorney General, and provided that the commissioner determines, after a public hearing,
that the plan is "in the best interest of the company, its policyholders, and the general
public." O.C.G.A. § 33-20-34 (Supp. 1999).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

Blue Cross developed a conversion plan for approval by the state
Insurance Commissioner in which stock in the new for-profit company
would be offered to Blue Cross subscribers." After "staff investigation
and a public hearing, the commissioner issued an [administrative] order
[allowing] Blue Cross to implement the conversion plan."9" No appeal
was taken from that order, nor was any objection made to the commissioner when forms were sent to eligible subscribers to give them the
option of receiving stock in the new for-profit entity.93 Nevertheless,
when the merger of the new for-profit entity with WellPoint Health
Networks was announced two years later, those Blue Cross subscribers
who did not accept the earlier stock offer filed a declaratory judgment
action to establish that they were shareholders entitled to profit from the
pending merger.9 4 The trial court agreed and enjoined the merger from
proceeding without this additional shareholder participation. 95
After noting that orders of the Insurance Commissioner fall within the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies96 and that there was
no judicial review from the commissioner's order or any later use of other
available administrative remedies, 9v the court concluded that failure to
exhaust such remedies precluded later judicial action to obtain equitable
relief:
The rationale for requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is
that resort to the administrative process will permit the agency to
apply its expertise, protect the agency's autonomy, allow a more
efficient resolution, and result in the uniform application of matters
within the agency's jurisdiction .... [T]he legislature entrusted the
insurance commissioner with overseeing the process of conversion ....
The commissioner's wide authority in this area can be respected only
if courts decline the invitation to interpret various clauses and terms

91. 271 Ga. at 65, 516 S.E.2d at 522-23.
92. Id., 516 S.E.2d at 523.
93. Id. at 65-66, 516 S.E.2d at 523. A petition for judicial review could have been filed
within thirty days after the commissioner's order. See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(b) (1998). In
addition, the subscribers could have sought a hearing and decision on the manner of
implementation of the conversion plan. See O.C.G.A. § 33-2-17 (1992). Finally, the
subscribers could have filed an administrative petition for declaratory ruling of the
commissioner's action. See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. R. 120-2-2-.05 (1983).
94. 271 Ga. at 66, 516 S.E.2d at 523.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing First Union Nat'l Bank of Ga. v. Independent Ins. Agents of Ga., 197 Ga.
App. 227, 228, 398 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1990); cf.Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co. v. James, 234
Ga. App. 403, 406, 506 S.E.2d 892, 894-95 (1998) (exhaustion is not a prerequisite for
maintenance of tort action that incidentally concerns violations of Insurance Code).
97. 271 Ga. at 66-67, 516 S.E.2d at 523.

1999]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

117

of an approved conversion plan. Such interpretation is the province of
the commissioner subject to judicial review as provided by statute."
Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required when a

challenge is made to the jurisdiction of an agency to take certain action.
In AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Forest Condominium Ass'n," the court
of appeals enjoined the construction of a communications tower, which
was to be built on property rezoned for a specific commercial use.'00
Because the county planning department issued a building permit for
the tower, AT&T contended on appeal that the residents should have
first appealed the county's decision to the local board of appeals.'0 '
The court disagreed, concluding that "the mere existence of an unexhausted administrative remedy does not, standing alone, afford a
defendant an absolute defense to a legal action" and, that because the
residents challenged the planning department's actions as an unlawful
usurpation of zoning authority, exhaustion would not be required "where
the defect urged goes to the power of the agency to issue the order."' 2
Therefore, the better course of action is almost always to pursue
administrative relief prior to initiating an action in superior court unless
it can be conclusively established that no such remedy is available or
adequate.
V.

STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

The statutory standard of review of agency decisions under the APA
is as follows:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as
to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may
affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantive evidence on the whole record; or

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 67, 516 S.E.2d at 524 (citations omitted).
235 Ga. App. 319, 509 S.E.2d 374 (1998).
Id. at 319, 509 S.E.2d at 375.
Id. at 321, 509 S.E.2d at 377.
Id. at 321-22, 509 S.E.2d at 377.
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(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.' °
During the survey period, the appellate courts substantially focused on
the fifth ground for judicial review referenced above.
Given that the superior court is precluded from substituting its
judgment for that of the agency regarding the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact,' the appellate courts have interpreted the "clearly
erroneous" standard of review similar to the "any evidence rule," which
makes findings of fact binding on appeal unless wholly unsupported by
the evidence. "The 'clearly erroneous' standard of review to be applied
by the superior court prevents a de novo determination of evidentiary
questions leaving only a determination of whether the facts found by the
[ALJ] are supported by 'any evidence.""'
In every case during the survey period in which a superior court
reversed a decision by an ALJ based on a contrary evidentiary determination, the court of appeals reversed the superior court based on
application of the any evidence rule.0 6 A case on point is Miles v.
Andress,' °7 which reviewed the decision of the Georgia Department of
Public Safety to suspend a driver's license based upon the department's
receipt of an unsatisfied judgment.' 8 The superior court reversed the
agency's decision, concluding that the suspension was inequitable.' 9
The court of appeals overturned the superior court's decision, noting that
the trial court erroneously attempted to invoke its power as a court of
equity when it was instead sitting as an appellate
court and was bound
1°
by the evidence presented before the agency.
The any evidence standard under the APA has been applied in other
administrative contexts. In appeals from administrative determinations
of the State Personnel Board, the superior court must also confine its
review to the record and cannot substitute its judgment for that of the

103. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) (1998).
104. Id.
105. Sawyer v. Reheis, 213 Ga. App. 727, 729, 445 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1994) (citing Hall
v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586, 242 S.E.2d 101, 102 (1978)).
106. See Reheis v. Drexel Chem. Co., 237 Ga. App. 87, 88, 514 S.E.2d 867, 868 (1999);
Reheis v. AZS Corp., 232 Ga. App. 852, 853, 503 S.E.2d 36, 37 (1998); Safety Fire Comm'r
v. U.S.A. Gas, Inc., 229 Ga. App. 807, 809, 494 S.E.2d 706, 709 (1997); Georgia Real Estate
Comm'n v. Peavy, 229 Ga. App. 201,202, 493 S.E.2d 602,603 (1997); Miles v. Andress, 229
Ga. App. 86, 87, 493 S.E.2d 233, 234 (1997).
107. 229 Ga. App. 86, 493 S.E.2d 233 (1997).
108. Id. at 86, 493 S.E.2d at 234. "The department, upon receipt of a certified copy of
an unsatisfied judgment, shall suspend the driver's license ... of the person against whom
such judgment was rendered except as provided. . . ." O.C.G.A. § 40-9-61(a) (1997).
109. 229 Ga. App. at 86, 493 S.E.2d at 234.
110. Id. at 86-87, 493 S.E.2d at 235.

1999]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

119

board regarding the weight of the evidence."' Using the any evidence
standard of review, the court of appeals has reversed decisions of
superior courts that rejected factual determinations that were made by
ALJs and agencies and that were based upon some evidence in the
record.112
Even when a statute requires a stricter evidentiary standard for
findings made by the agency, the superior court's review still is
constrained by the any evidence rule. For example, an application for
a solid waste landfill permit can be denied only if clear and convincing
evidence reveals that the applicant has attempted to obtain the permit
by misrepresentation.11 Nevertheless, in reviewing an ALJ's decision
to uphold the agency's denial of the permit, the superior court still must
affirm that decision if it is supported by some evidence in the record." 4
The term "substantial evidence" also has been equated to any evidence
when the superior court is sitting as an appellate tribunal. In City of
Atlanta Government v. Smith, 5 a police officer was terminated after
an evidentiary hearing for filing a false report and paying money
confiscated from an arrest to an informant working in an undercover
sting operation. The officer appealed to the city civil service board,
contending that he was entrapped, but the board rejected that defense
because the appeal was a civil, rather than a criminal, proceeding. The
superior court reviewed the board's decision pursuant to O.C.G.A. section
5-4-12(b), which limits the scope of review on certiorari to the superior
court to a determination of whether the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. The court reversed the board's decision based, in part, on
the ground that due process principles precluded the city from disciplining the officer because its behavior was so outrageous. 1 6
The court of appeals sitting en banc reviewed some of its earlier
decisions in which it distinguished between the any evidence and
substantial evidence standards.11 ' However, in 1991 the supreme
court held that "in Georgia, the substantial-evidence standard is

111. O.C.G.A. § 45-20-9(m) (1990).
112. See, e.g., Georgia Mountains Community Serv. Bd. v. Carter, 237 Ga. App. 84, 8687, 514 S.E.2d 86,87 (1999); Department of Correction v. Glisson, 235 Ga. App. 51, 52, 508
S.E.2d 714, 715 (1998).
113. O.C.G.A. § 12-8-23.1(a)(3)(B)(ii) (1998).
114. Bartram Env'tl, Inc. v. Reheis, 235 Ga. App. 204, 207, 509 S.E.2d 114, 116-17
(1998).
115. 228 Ga. App. 864, 493 S.E.2d 51 (1997).
116. Id. at 865, 493 S.E.2d at 52.
117. Id. at 866, 493 S.E.2d at 53 (citing Pelis v. LaPorte, 203 Ga. App. 850, 851, 418
S.E.2d 124, 125 (1992); Smith v. Elder, 174 Ga. App. 316, 316, 329 S.E.2d 511, 512 (1985)).
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effectively the same as the any-evidence standard."11 Consequently,
the court of appeals overruled its earlier cases recognizing a distinction
between the two standards, reversed the superior court's judgment
because some evidence supported the board's decision that the police
officer engaged in inappropriate conduct, and held that entrapment was
not available as a defense." 9
Accordingly, the odds of a court reversing an ALJ's or agency's decision
based upon lack of evidence to support that decision are very slim. Even
if a superior court can be convinced to overturn the administrative
ruling, it is highly unlikely that the appellate courts will find that no
evidence supports the decision. Instead, they will usually hold that the
trial court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the agency in
question.
VI.

APPEALS FROM SUPERIOR COURT

Under O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35(a)(1) and (b), appeals from decisions of
the superior courts that review decisions made by state and local
administrative agencies must be by application for a discretionary
appeal. Although this requirement appears to be simple, there are
regular examples of the proper procedure not being followed. The survey
period was no exception. In Simmons v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation,120 a direct appeal was taken from the decision of a superior court
affirming the dismissal of a state law enforcement agent for misappropriating state funds, which an ALJ and the State Personnel Board
approved.1 ' The court of appeals summarily dismissed
the appeal for
22
failure to file an application for discretionary appeal.
On occasion an issue arises regarding whether an order of the superior
court reviewing an administrative decision is appealable. In many
instances, when the superior court remands the case to the agency for
additional proceedings, the remand order itself is not considered a final
order for purposes of further appeal.123 In rare circumstances, a
remand order may be appealable.'2 4 For example, in Georgia Public

118. Emory Univ. v. Levitas, 260 Ga. 894, 897, 401 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1991).
119. 228 Ga. App. at 865-67, 493 S.E.2d at 52-54; accord Angell v. Hart, 232 Ga. App.
222, 223, 501 S.E.2d 594, 595-96 (1998).
120. 236 Ga. App. 59, 510 S.E.2d 618 (1999).
121. Id. at 59, 510 S.E.2d at 619.

122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 595, 203 S.E.2d 206, 207 (1974); State
Health Planning Review Bd. v. Piedmont Hosp., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 450, 451, 326 S.E.2d
814, 815 (1985).
124. See, e.g., Tri-State Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Reid, 251 Ga. 38, 39, 302 S.E.2d 566, 568
(1983).
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Service Commission v. Campaign for a ProsperousGeorgia,'1 5 the PSC,

after a limited hearing, issued an Accounting Order that adopted an
alternative rate plan and range of return on equity for Georgia Power
Company. After concluding that the Accounting Order was illegal and
that the PSC should have treated the matter as a rate case with a full
APA-type hearing, the superior court remanded the case to the
commission. 126 The PSC and Georgia Power appealed the remand
order to the court of appeals, which concluded that the order was
appealable because the superior court, rather than remanding for
additional evidence that would facilitate a final review of the issue,
determined that the challenged process constituted a rate case requiring
a full hearing."'
VII.

OPEN RECORDS AND OPEN MEETINGS

The Open Records Law
Since its origin in 1959 and continuing until the present, Georgia's
open records law' 28 has been interpreted broadly by the courts, with
most public records held to be disclosable and most exceptions to public
disclosure treated very narrowly.129 In Fincher v. State,l" ° the court
of appeals addressed the issue of whether the State should be liable to
a third party for invasion of privacy for releasing a public record.
Pursuant to an open records request from a television station, the State
Board of Pardons and Paroles released an investigative report containing
claims of sexual harrassment by an employee against Fincher, who sued
the board for invading his right to privacy. The trial court granted the
board's motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals
affirmed.131
While there was little doubt that the report was a public record,
Fincher contended that the report should have been kept confidential
because it was part of his personnel file.' 32 However, there is no

A.

125. 229 Ga. App. 28, 492 S.E.2d 916 (1997).
126. Id. at 29, 492 S.E.2d at 917.
127. Id.
128. 1959 Ga. Laws 88 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (1998 &
Supp. 1999)).
129. For a discussion of cases analyzing Georgia's open records and open meetings
statutes through 1987, see Mark H. Cohen & Stephanie B. Manis, Georgia'sOpen Records
and Open Meetings Laws: A Continued March Toward Government in the Sunshine, 40
MERCER L. REV. 1 (1988).
130. 231 Ga. App. 49, 497 S.E.2d 632 (1998).
131. Id. at 50, 497 S.E.2d at 634.
132. Id. at 51, 497 S.E.2d at 635.
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blanket exception in the open records law for personnel records, and the
supreme court previously held that mere placement of investigative
records in a personnel file does not transform them into confidential
personnel records.133 Moreover, the open records law specifically permits
the release of an investigative file ten days after it has been presented
to an agency for action or the investigation has otherwise been
concluded.134
Disclosure of public records still is not required for "medical or
veterinary records and similar files, the disclosure of which would be an
invasion of personal privacy."' 35 The invasion of privacy encompassed
by the "similar files" exception has been the subject of a significant
amount of litigation. The issue of whether the exception applies in a
given situation has been held to be resolved by an examination of the
tort of invasion of privacy,'36 although this does not exclude a legitimate inquiry into the operation of a government institution and those
employed by it. 3 v The tort of invasion of privacy protects the right to
be free from unwarranted publicity as well as from the "publicizing of
one's private
affairs with which the public has no legitimate con138
cern."
The application of the "personal privacy" exception must be considered
on a case-by-case basis. In Fincher the court found the public interest
in obtaining the information, which involved the alleged illegal activity
139
by a public employee, outweighed the employee's privacy interests.
Because this is one area of the open records law in which the courts
have occasionally ruled in favor of maintaining the confidentiality of
records, it may be advisable to notify the person whose privacy interests
may be implicated in advance of any release of records to provide that
person with an opportunity to file a court action to block the release
based on the right to privacy.
In 1999, pursuant to legislation advocated by the Governor, the
General Assembly enacted the first major expansion of the open records
law in a decade. 4 ° First, the definition of what constitutes a "public
record" was broadened to include

133.
(1984)).
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
various

Id. (citing Irvin v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 253 Ga. 43, 44, 316 S.E.2d 449, 451
Id. at 52, 497 S.E.2d at 635 (citing O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(5) (1998)).
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(2) (1998).
See Athens Observer, Inc. v. Anderson, 245 Ga. 63, 65, 263 S.E.2d 128, 130 (1980).
See Harris v. Cox Enter., 256 Ga. 299, 299-300, 348 S.E.2d 448, 449 (1986).
Napper v. Georgia Television Co., 257 Ga. 156, 160, 356 S.E.2d 640, 644 (1987).
231 Ga. App. at 53, 497 S.E.2d at 636.
1999 Ga. Laws 552; 1999 Ga. Laws 809; 1999 Ga. Laws 1222 (each codified at
sections of O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (1998 & Supp. 1999)).
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[r]ecords received or maintained by a private person, firm, corporation,
or other private entity in the performance of a service or function for
or on behalf of an agency, a public agency, or a public office ...to the
same extent that such records would be subject to disclosure if received
or maintained by such agency, public agency, or public office."'
This goes beyond the prior provision, which affected only those
documents received or maintained by a private entity "on behalf of' an
agency.142 Now, unless otherwise exempted, any document collected
by a private entity pursuant to an agreement
with an agency will be
14 3
considered a disclosable public record.
Second, the 1999 amendments now mandate that records must be
made available for public inspection within three business days of the
request (rather than just making a determination of whether the
requested records are disclosable), and, for those not made available, a
written description of the records and the timetable for their ultimate
release must be made available within that same time period.'
If the
records custodian denies access to requested records, in whole or in part,
there must be a written specification of the legal authority that exempts
the records from disclosure "by Code section, subsection, and paragraph"
within three business days. 4 '
Third, if requested records are maintained by computer, they should
be "made available where practical by electronic means."' 46 Finally,
a willful violation of the open records law is now a misdemeanor punish4
able by a fine of up to $100.'
The amendments also alter certain existing exceptions to disclosure
under the open records law as follows:
(1) A new provision permits social security numbers and insurance or
medical information in personnel records to be redacted from otherwise
4
open records.' 1

141. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(a) (Supp. 1999).
142. Id. § 50-18-70(a) (1998).
143. The appellate courts have held that, under the former law, private corporations
that perform functions on behalf of a public agency are under the auspices of the open
records law. See, e.g., Northwest Ga. Health Sys., Inc. v. Times-Journal, 218 Ga. App. 336,
340,461 S.E.2d 297,300 (1995); Clayton County Hosp. Auth. v. Webb, 208 Ga. App. 91, 95,
430 S.E.2d 89, 93 (1993).
144. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(f) (Supp. 1999).
145. Id. § 50-18-72(h).
146. Id. § 50-18-70(g).
147. Id. § 50-18-74(a).
148. Id. § 50-18-72(a)(11.1).
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(2) An amendment to an existing provision altered the exception from
disclosure for certain real estate appraisals and engineering or feasibility
149
estimates to apply only until the time the final award is made.
(3) A new provision provides that Individual Georgia Uniform Motor
Vehicle Accident Reports can be disclosed only if the requesting party
submits a written statement of need, which the provision defines, and
if a copy of the report is made available to the person identified in the
report or that person's representative. 5
The amendments also added a new Code section to specify that "[tihe
procedures and fees provided for in [the open records law] shall not
apply to public records ... requested in writing by a state or federal
grand jury, taxing authority, law enforcement agency, or prosecuting
attorney in conjunction with an ongoing administrative, criminal, or tax
5
investigation."
B.

The Open Meetings Law

Although the case law interpreting the open meetings law".. is not
as extensive as the case law analyzing open records issues, the appellate
courts similarly tend to favor openness by reading statutory exceptions
narrowly. Nevertheless, to overturn action taken by a governmental
body, a violation must be clearly proven. During the survey period, the
supreme court reviewed the actions of a county commission in Board of
Commissioners v. Levetan,13 in which one of the county commissioners
contended that the ordinance was invalid because some commission
members discussed it in a closed meeting prior to a public vote.'
However, the open meetings law contains no provision authorizing the
invalidation of an ordinance on the ground that its subject matter was
discussed at earlier meetings held in violation of the law. 5 ' As long
the ordinance in a public meeting, the
as the county commission1 adopted
6
official action is binding.
There were also significant legislative changes to the open meetings
law in 1999. The General Assembly amended the law to clarify that
public corporations are now covered by the requirements of the Act."'
In addition, there is now a requirement that, prior to any meeting, an

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. § 50-18-72(a)(6).
Id. § 50-18-72(a)(4.1).
Id. § 50-18-77.
Id. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
270 Ga. 544, 512 S.E.2d 627 (1999).
Id. at 549, 512 S.E.2d at 632.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 (a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1999).
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agenda of all expected matters must be made available and posted at the
meeting site during the two-week period prior to the meeting.158
Failure to list an item on the agenda does not preclude its consideration
at the meeting.15 9
Perhaps the most important revision is the protection afforded to a
closed meeting by requiring the presiding officer to execute and file with
the official minutes of the meeting an affidavit attesting that the closed
meeting was devoted to matters that can legally be discussed in a closed
meeting under the Act.' °

158. Id. § 50-14-1(e)(1).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 50-14-4(b).

